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Abstract—Function-as-a-Service (FaaS) is a recent and al-
ready very popular paradigm in cloud computing. The function
provider need only specify the function to be run, usually in
a high-level language like JavaScript, and the service provider
orchestrates all the necessary infrastructure and software stacks.
The function provider is only billed for the actual computational
resources used by the function while it is running. Compared
to previous cloud paradigms, FaaS requires significantly more
fine-grained resource measurement mechanisms, for example
to measure the compute time and memory usage of a single
function invocation with sub-second accuracy. Thanks to the short
duration and stateless nature of functions, and the availability of
multiple open-source frameworks, FaaS enables small ephemeral
entities (e.g. individuals or data centers with spare capacity) to
become service providers. However, this exacerbates the already
substantial challenge of ensuring the resource consumption of
the function is measured accurately and reported reliably. It also
raises the issues of ensuring the computation is done correctly
and minimizing the amount of information leaked to the service
provider.
To address these challenges, we introduce S-FaaS, the first ar-
chitecture and implementation of FaaS to provide strong security
and accountability guarantees backed by Intel SGX. To match
the dynamic event-driven nature of FaaS, our design introduces
a new key distribution enclave and a novel transitive attestation
protocol. A core contribution of S-FaaS is our set of resource
measurement mechanisms that securely measure compute time
inside an enclave, and actual memory allocations. We have
integrated S-FaaS into the popular OpenWhisk FaaS framework.
We evaluate the security of our architecture, the accuracy of our
resource measurement mechanisms, and the performance of our
implementation, showing that our resource measurement mecha-
nisms add less than 6.3% performance overhead on standardized
benchmarks. S-FaaS can be integrated with smart contracts to
enable decentralized payment for outsourced computation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Function-as-a-Service (FaaS) is a recent paradigm in out-
sourced computation that has generated significant interest
from cloud providers and developers. The function provider
need only specify the function to be performed, whilst the
service provider provides all the infrastructure necessary to
run, scale, and load-balance the function. Compared to the
Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) paradigm, FaaS significantly
simplifies the task of the function provider, who no longer
needs to requisition a specific number of virtual machines
(VMs), or install and maintain a full software stack. FaaS also
improves efficiency for the service provider, who can now op-
timize the underlying infrastructure to maximize performance
Author names listed in alphabetical order.
and throughput, whilst only isolating individual functions from
one another.
The function provider only pays for the computational
resources actually used by the function, instead of being billed
to run a number of full-stack VMs. For example, Amazon
Web Service (AWS) Lambda is billed based on the number
of function invocations and the time-integral of the function’s
memory usage, measured in Gigabyte-seconds (GB-s) [4].
Google Cloud Functions follows a similar billing structure,
but also includes raw compute time, measured in Gigahertz-
seconds (GHz-s), and network usage, measured in GB [21].
In addition to large cloud providers, the highly dynamic
nature of FaaS also makes it possible for smaller entities
to become ephemeral FaaS service providers. Specifically,
compared to the long-lived VMs in the IaaS paradigm, the
short runtimes and stateless nature of FaaS functions make it
possible for data centres with spare capacity or even individu-
als with suitably powerful PCs and stable internet connections
(e.g. gamers) to become FaaS service providers. The idea
of outsourcing computation to individuals or small service
providers has existed for many years, and has spawned suc-
cessful projects like SETI@home [37], Folding@home [18],
and ClimatePrediction.net [16]. However, these perform fixed
computations, and on a voluntary basis. A new trend, evi-
denced by recent projects like the Golem network [19], aims
to support arbitrary computation and also to remunerate the
entities who perform the computation.
Any type of outsourced computing raises multiple security
concerns, but FaaS arguably makes these more acute. Firstly
in terms of integrity, the function provider has no control of
the underlying software stack, and so has less certainty that
the function is being executed correctly. Secondly in terms of
confidentiality, the functions’ inputs and outputs are directly
visible to the service provider. Finally, in terms of accountabil-
ity, the fine-grained sub-second resource measurements in FaaS
are significantly more difficult to audit than the coarse-grained
billing of IaaS, where usage is typically measured per VM per
hour [3]. At present, function providers are required to trust
that service providers are honest, based solely on the latter’s
reputation. Although this may be acceptable in the case of
large cloud providers, it would almost certainly preclude small
ephemeral service providers from providing FaaS services. The
challenge is therefore to provide security and accountability for
FaaS services hosted by any service provider.
To overcome these challenges, we present S-FaaS, an ap-
proach for providing security and accountability in FaaS using
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Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX). SGX is a modern
Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) providing hardware-
based isolation and protection for code and data inside an
enclave. Our S-FaaS architecture encapsulates individual func-
tions inside SGX enclaves, and uses remote attestation to
provide various guarantees to relying parties. Specifically, S-
FaaS enhances security by protecting the integrity and au-
thenticity of the function inputs and outputs, and provides
strong assurance to the client that the outputs are the result
of a correct execution of the function with the given inputs.
S-FaaS provides accountability by producing a verifiable mea-
surement of the fine-grained resource usage of each function
invocation. Crucially, this measurement can be verified by both
the service provider and the function provider, even though
the latter does not control the software stack. S-FaaS can also
enhance privacy by hiding the function’s inputs and outputs
from the service provider. However, given the various side-
channel attacks that have recently been demonstrated against
SGX, we only claim to enhance privacy for a specific class
of functions in which the control flow and memory access
patterns are input-independent. Defending against such side-
channel attacks is an orthogonal challenge to our work.
To the best of our knowledge we are the first to investigate
trustworthiness and metering of outsourced computation in
the context of FaaS. We provide a full implementation and
evaluation of our architecture in order to 1) investigate the
subtleties of such a design (e.g. in terms of integrating it
into existing frameworks), and 2) to measure the performance
overhead of this type of architecture. The ability to accu-
rately measure resource usage of SGX enclaves is a new and
challenging problem, since it goes well beyond the current
functionality provided by SGX. Inspired by the reference clock
developed by Chen et al. [14], we develop a set of accurate
and trustworthy resource measurement mechanisms for SGX
enclaves, using Intel Transactional Synchronization Extensions
(TSX), which can be deployed without any hardware changes.
Although we demonstrate them in the context of FaaS, these
mechanisms can be used in various other SGX applications.
We have integrated S-FaaS into the Apache OpenWhisk FaaS
framework [5].
In summary, we claim the following contributions:
• Design of S-FaaS: We develop an architecture for protect-
ing FaaS deployments using Intel SGX that 1) ensures the
integrity (and in some cases confidentiality) of function
inputs and outputs, and 2) provides clients with strong
assurance that the outputs are the result of a correct exe-
cution of the function with the given inputs (Section V).
• SGX resource measurement: We present a set of mech-
anisms for accurately measuring the compute time, mem-
ory, and network usage of a function executing inside an
SGX enclave, in a manner that can be trusted by both the
service provider and function provider (Section VI).
• Full implementation of S-FaaS: We provide a proof-of-
concept implementation of the architecture and resource
measurement mechanisms as part of the OpenWhisk
FaaS framework (Section VII). We systematically eval-
uate S-FaaS and show that its resource measurement
mechanisms are accurate and that it can provide all
security guarantees with minimal performance overhead
(Section VIII).
Fig. 1. Main entities and interactions in FaaS.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Function as a Service
Figure 1 shows a generalized overview of a FaaS scenario.
The computational infrastructure on which the function is
executed is operated by the service provider. We distinguish
between the entity that provisions the function, i.e. the function
provider, and the entity that invokes the function, i.e. the client.
The client supplies the inputs on which the function is run, and
receives the corresponding output. The service provider bills
the function provider for the resources used by the function. In
some cases, the function provider could be the sole client. For
example, an enterprise could outsource an infrequently used
but computationally intensive function (e.g. generating reports
from historical data) to a FaaS service, and only allow it to be
invoked by authorized employees. Alternatively, the function
provider can determine which other entities may access the
function as clients. For example, to deal with highly variable
demand, a web developer could provision a function that
can be directly invoked from authorized users’ web browsers
(possibly via an API gateway like that provided by AWS [2]).
In IaaS, billing policies typically consider the number of
hours for which a VM is running. In contrast, a single FaaS
function may run for less than a second, and thus FaaS requires
very fine-grained resource measurements. The following types
of resource measurements are used in the billing policies of
different FaaS service providers:
• Function invocations: the number of times the function
is called.
• Compute time: the execution time of the function multi-
plied by the frequency of the CPU, typically measured in
GHz-seconds (GHz-s), which is dimensionally equivalent
to CPU cycles.
• Memory time-integral: the execution time of the func-
tion multiplied by the amount of memory provisioned or
used, measured in Gigabyte-seconds (GB-s). This can be
calculated using either the maximum allowable memory,
the maximum allocated memory, the average allocated
memory, or the time-varying memory allocation.
• Network usage: the amount of data sent or received,
measured in Gigabytes (GB).
Table I gives examples of different FaaS service providers
and the types of resource measurements used in their billing
policies. Note that calculating the memory time-integral inher-
ently requires measuring the execution time of the function
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(indicated by ◦), even if the compute time itself is not used
directly in the billing policy.
TABLE I. BILLING POLICIES OF SOME CURRENT FAAS SERVICES
Service Invocations Time Memory Network
AWS Lambda [4] X ◦ X
Azure Functions [32] X ◦ X
Google Cloud Functions [21] X X X X
IBM Cloud functions [25] X ◦ X
B. Intel SGX
Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) technology is a
set of CPU extensions that allow applications to instantiate
isolated execution environments, called enclaves, containing
application-defined code. An enclave runs as part of an ap-
plication process (i.e. the host application) in the applications
virtual address space, but data inside an enclave can only be
accessed by code within the same enclave. Code within the
enclave can only be called from the untrusted host application
via well-defined call gates. An ECALL refers to untrusted code
calling a function inside the enclave, thus transferring control
to the enclave, and an OCALL refers to enclave code calling
an untrusted function outside the enclave. SGX therefore
protects the integrity of enclave code and the confidentiality
and integrity of enclave data against all other software on the
platform, including privileged system software like the OS and
hypervisor.
By design, enclave code can be interrupted at any time
by the untrusted software (e.g. to allow the OS to schedule
another process). This is referred to as an Asynchronous
Enclave Exit (AEX). After the interrupt has been completed,
the host application can resume the enclave’s operation using
the ERESUME instruction, which continues the enclave’s
execution from the point at which it was interrupted. Critically,
this AEX and ERESUME are handled by the the CPU, and
are thus transparent to the enclave’s code.
As part of its internal data structures, an enclave allocates
one or more Thread Control Structure (TCS) data structures
in protected memory. The number of TCS data structures
determines the maximum number of threads that may enter the
enclave concurrently. Whenever a thread enters the enclave, it
is associated with a free TCS, which it marks as busy and uses
to store state information. Specifically, the enclave allocates a
stack of Save State Areas (SSAs) for each TCS, and the TCS
contains a pointer to the current SSA (CSSA). When enclave
code is interrupted, the CPU stores its current register values
in the current SSA for that thread, and fills the registers with
synthetic contents before switching to the untrusted code, to
avoid leaking secrets. When an enclave thread is resumed (via
ERESUME), the CPU reloads its registers from the SSA and
continues executing. Code inside the enclave cannot read the
TCS data structures, but can read and modify SSAs.
Every enclave has an enclave identity, called the MREN-
CLAVE value, which is a cryptographic hash of the enclave’s
configuration, e.g. memory pages, at the time it was initialized.
Enclaves containing precisely the same code and configuration
will have the same MRENCLAVE value, even if they are run
on different physical hardware platforms. An enclave has a
signing identity, called the MRSIGNER value, which is the
hash of the public key of the developer who signed the enclave.
In addition to isolated execution, SGX provides sealed stor-
age by allowing each enclave to encrypt (i.e. seal) persistent
data so that it can be stored outside the enclave. Data can be
sealed either against MRENCLAVE, such that it can only be
unsealed by precisely the same enclave running on the same
physical platform. Alternatively, data can be sealed against
MRSIGNER, such that it can be unsealed on the same platform
by any enclave signed by the same developer key.
SGX also provides remote attestation, a process through
which an enclave can prove its identity (i.e. its MRENCLAVE
and MRSIGNER values) to a remote verifier. Specifically,
SGX creates a quote consisting of the enclave’s identity and a
small amount of user-defined data (e.g. hashes of public keys
generated by the enclave). This quote can be verified using the
Intel Attestation Service (IAS).
C. Intel TSX
Intel Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX)1 is
an instruction set extension, available since the Haswell mi-
croarchitecture, providing transactional memory support in
hardware. TSX is designed to improve performance of con-
current programs by reducing the use of software-based lock
primitives (e.g. mutex or spinlock). TSX can be used inside
an SGX enclave.
We focus on four of the new instructions introduced by
TSX, namely XBEGIN, XEND, XABORT, and XTEST. The
XBEGIN and XEND instructions are used to designate the
beginning and end of a transactional region of code. The
XABORT instruction aborts a currently executing transaction.
XTEST is used to test if the thread is currently within a
transaction.
For each transaction, the CPU maintains a read-set and
write-set, consisting of all data memory addresses (at cache-
line granularity) that will be read or written by the transac-
tion. The CPU monitors accesses to these addresses by other
threads, and if a conflicting access is detected, the transaction
is aborted. In particular, the transaction will be aborted if any
other thread writes to an address in the transaction’s read-set.
A transaction is also aborted by any asynchronous exception
(e.g. an OS interrupt).
If a transaction is aborted, the CPU will not commit any
writes from the transactional region to memory. The CPU will
execute the transaction’s abort handler, which was registered
when the transaction was started. This handler can decide
whether to re-attempt the hardware transaction, or proceed to
a fallback path, which typically uses a software lock primitive.
III. THREAT MODEL AND REQUIREMENTS
A. Threat Model
Given the context in which a FaaS deployment operates,
we assume the following two types of adversaries:
The service provider could be adversarial from the per-
spective of the function provider and the clients. This entity has
1http://www.intel.com/software/tsx
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the capability to run arbitrary software on the server platforms,
including privileged software and SGX enclaves. Specifically,
with full control of the OS, this entity can interrupt and resume
enclaves at any time e.g. using the SGX-Step framework [40]
to interrupt the enclave with single-instruction granularity.
An adversarial service provider could have the following
objectives:
• Learn the inputs and outputs of the specific function
invocations.
• Modify the inputs and outputs, or execute the function
incorrectly.
• Overcharge the function provider, either by falsely inflat-
ing resource usage measurements or making fake requests
to the function.
The function provider could be adversarial from the
perspective of the service provider, and has the ability to
submit arbitrary functions to the service. We assume that the
function provider is not adversarial from the perspective of
the clients, since they have decided to use the function. This
adversary could have the following objective:
• Under-report resources used by the function.
We assume it is infeasible for any entity to subvert
correctly-implemented cryptographic primitives. Although var-
ious side-channel attacks have been demonstrated against SGX
(e.g. [42], [11], [30], [7], [13]), defending against these is an
orthogonal challenge, as we discuss in Section IX.
B. Requirements
Based on the above adversary capabilities and objectives,
we define the following requirements:
R1 Security: The service provider must be prevented from
modifying the inputs or outputs of a function invocation,
and the client must receive assurance that output O is the
result of a correct execution of the intended function F
on the supplied inputs I.
R2 Privacy: For functions exhibiting input-independent con-
trol flow and memory access patterns, the service provider
must be prevented from learning the inputs I or outputs
O of a function invocation.
R3 Measurement accuracy: The system must produce an
accurate measurement of the resource usage of each func-
tion invocation, consisting of the total time for which the
function was executing, the time-integral of the function’s
memory usage, and the total network traffic sent and
received by the function.
R4 Measurement veracity: Both the service provider and
function provider must be able to verify the authenticity
of the resource measurement.
In some cases, it may also be desirable to hide the behavior
of the function itself from the service provider (e.g. a secret
algorithm). Although this may be possible in certain cases, the
ability to hide the code executing in the enclave is not part of
the security guarantees of SGX, and so is beyond the scope of
our current work.
IV. DESIGN CHALLENGES
Securing a FaaS system using SGX requires solving mul-
tiple challenges. In this section we outline the principal chal-
lenges, and the associated sub-challenges arising from these.
A. Dynamic server utilization
Even compared to existing cloud computing paradigms like
IaaS, FaaS is significantly more dynamic in terms of server
utilization. For example, the popular OpenWhisk FaaS frame-
work spawns a new worker environment for each invocation of
a function. These worker environments can be spawned on any
available physical server. Furthermore, a worker environment
may only be provisioned with the function it will run after the
system receives an invocation request for that function from the
client. Whilst this gives service providers significant flexibility
(e.g. to perform load balancing), it poses multiple challenges
if the function is to be run within an SGX enclave.
C1 Encrypting client input: The first challenge is that,
to achieve Requirements R1 and R2, the client’s inputs must
be encrypted before knowing which worker enclave will run
the function. We therefore require a type of transferable state,
consisting of a set of cryptographic keys, that can be distributed
to any worker enclave. Since the service provider is potentially
adversarial, we cannot trust this entity to store and distribute
the state. To solve this, our architecture includes a new key
distribution enclave (KDE) to securely generate and distribute
the necessary keys to the dynamically created worker enclaves
(Section V-A).
C2 Attesting worker enclaves: The second challenge is
that this dynamic server utilization and one-shot function invo-
cation precludes the use of standard SGX remote attestation,
in which a client would establish the trustworthiness of a
specific worker enclave via a multi-round-trip protocol, before
sending any secrets to the enclave. Even if the client’s input is
encrypted using keys from the KDE, the client still needs to
establish the same level of trust as if it had attested the worker
enclave. We solve this by developing a new type of transitive
attestation scheme (Section V-B).
B. Fine-grained resource usage measurement
As explained in Section II-A, FaaS requires an accurate
mechanism for measuring the compute time of a function,
either to be used directly in the billing policy, or to calculate
other billing metrics like the time-integral of the function’s
memory usage. Even if a function is run inside an SGX
enclave, we still require an accurate and trustworthy mech-
anism to measure the enclave’s compute time, to achieve
requirements R3 and R4.
C3 Measuring time in enclaves: SGX does not include
any direct functionality to securely measure execution time
of an enclave. In particular, although the rdtsc instruc-
tion ostensibly returns the number of cycles since reset, this
value can be modified by a malicious OS or hypervisor. The
sgx_get_trusted_time function included in the SGX
SDK cannot be used for measuring an enclave’s execution time
because it can be arbitrarily delayed by the OS, since it requires
the enclave to make an OCALL. Furthermore, any timing
mechanism must account for the fact that the OS can interrupt
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Fig. 2. Service Provider architecture in S-FaaS.
the enclave at any point in its execution (causing an AEX),
wait for an arbitrary period of time, and then transparently
resume the enclave using ERESUME. To solve this challenge,
we develop a custom mechanism for measuring the time spent
executing a function inside the enclave (Section VI-A), using
Intel TSX.
C4 Sandboxing untrusted functions: One constraint of
our timing mechanism is that it must be run in the same enclave
as the function it measures, which gives rise to a second
order challenge. To fulfil requirement R4, both the service
provider and function provider must be able to trust the timing
measurement, which is challenging given that we assume each
may be adversarial from the other’s perspective (Section III-A).
From the function provider’s perspective, the enclave protects
the measurement from manipulation by the service provider.
However, from the service provider’s perspective, the enclave
does not protect the measurement against malicious functions
supplied by the function provider. To address this, we ensure
that the function is sandboxed within the enclave, in order to
protect the resource measurement mechanisms (Section V).
V. ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN
In this section we present our overall S-FaaS architecture.
We first describe the principal entities and then discuss the
main types of operations and interactions between these enti-
ties.
Figure 2 shows an overview of the service provider in
our architecture. The service provider runs a centralized key
distribution enclave (KDE) and a variable number of worker
enclaves. The worker enclaves can be run on different physical
servers.
Key distribution enclave (KDE): To address challenges
C1 and C2 described in Section IV-A, we introduce a KDE
that is responsible for securely generating and distributing keys
to various entities. The KDE pre-generates the necessary key
pairs and then distributes the public keys to clients and the
corresponding private keys to worker enclaves. For scalability
reasons, a service provider may run multiple KDEs. Clients can
be directed to any KDE, but client requests encrypted under
keys from a specific KDE can only be processed by worker
enclaves that have also obtained keys from the same KDE.
Worker enclave: Worker enclaves are responsible for
running the functions with the provided inputs and measuring
the functions’ resource usage. As shown in Figure 2, each
worker enclave consists of two main subsystems: a sandboxed
interpreter, in which the function is run, and our resource
measurement mechanisms. This design is motivated by the
following two factors: First, for performance reasons, the
service provider will typically create a pool of worker enclaves
and then dynamically provision functions to worker enclaves
as requests are received. Our use of an interpreter allows
any worker enclave to run any function. This also has the
benefit that all worker enclaves share the same enclave identity
(MRENCLAVE value), which simplifies key distribution and
attestation. Second, as outlined in Section IV-B, one important
constraint of our resource measurement mechanisms is that
they must be run within the same enclave as the function they
measure, and must thus be protected from other code running
in the same enclave (Challenge C4). By running the func-
tion in a sandboxed interpreter, our design inherently solves
this challenge. Even without our architecture, a FaaS service
provider would always run functions in some type of sandbox
in order to isolate different functions from one another and
protect the underlying infrastructure from potentially malicious
functions. If using S-FaaS, the service provider does not need
an additional sandbox. The specific operations performed by
our worker enclave are described in Section V-E
Figure 3 shows a high-level overview of the sequence
of interactions between the function provider, KDE, worker
enclave, and client. We explain these interactions in detail in
the following sections.
A. Key Distribution
The KDE pre-generates a key set, consisting of the follow-
ing three asymmetric key pairs:
• A key agreement key kka, which is used to authenticate
the worker enclave to clients and establish a shared
session key K with each client.
• An output signing key kout, which is used to create a
type of signed receipt indicating that the outputs are the
result of a correct invocation of the executed function for
the given inputs. This receipt can be verified by entities
other than the client, and is only produced if requested
by the client.
• A resource measurement signing key kres, which is
used to sign the final resource measurement for each
invocation of the function.
As shown in the first part of Figure 3, the KDE distributes
these keys to the worker enclaves. Depending on the service
provider’s configuration, the same key set can be provisioned
to any number of worker enclaves. Sharing a key set amongst
more worker enclaves makes load balancing easier, but in-
creases the risk of having to revoke the key set if any worker
enclave is physically compromised. The service provider can
also rotate the key sets as frequently as required.
The KDE also distributes the corresponding public keys to
the function provider and clients. A client can thus use the
public key agreement key kka+ in conjunction with her own
key agreement key kc to generate a symmetric session key K.
For example, this could be implemented using elliptic curve
Diffie-Hellman key agreement. When communicating with the
enclave, the client will send her public key kc+, and then
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Fig. 3. Sequence of interactions between the provisioning enclave, worker enclave, function provider, and client. kx+ denotes the public key corresponding to
kx, h() denotes a cryptographic hash function, {}K denotes an encryption under key K, and []S denotes a signature using key S.
encrypt all further information under the session key K, thus
solving Challenge C1.
B. Transitive Attestation
As explained in Challenge C2 (Section IV-A), in a typical
FaaS deployment it is not possible to have each client and
function provider (i.e. the relying parties) perform a remote
attestation of the worker enclave for each function invocation.
Instead, we use a new type of transitive attestation approach
to allow the relying parties to establish an equivalent level of
trust as if they had attested the relevant worker enclave, whilst
only attesting the centralized KDE.
When the KDE generates a new key set, it produces an
SGX quote that can be verified using the Intel Attestation
Service (IAS). This quote includes the enclave identity of the
KDE (MREKDE) as well as the hashes of the three generated
public keys (kka+, kout+, and kres+) and the enclave identity
of the worker enclaves (MREWE). By design, the KDE will
only distribute the corresponding private keys to a worker
enclave whose identity matches MREWE .
When a worker enclave requires its key set, the KDE
attests the worker enclave, and checks that the attested identity
matches MREWE . The service provider can also implement
additional policies outside the KDE, e.g. to ensure that keys
can only be distributed to physical machines within the service
provider’s data center.
Therefore, the full chain of trust is as follows:
1) The relying parties attest the KDE to verify that i) a
particular key set was generated by a valid KDE, and
ii) the KDE will only distribute those keys to a specific
type of worker enclave;
2) The KDE attests each worker enclave and checks its
identity before distributing the key set;
3) The worker enclave interacts with the relying parties
using the key set it received, thus establishing a transitive
trust relationship between the relying parties and worker
enclave.
C. Function Provisioning & Measurement
The function provider is assumed to have a business
relationship with the service provider, including a means to
authenticate itself (e.g. username and password, or public key).
The service provider uses this mechanism to control who may
provision functions. These intermediate steps are not shown in
Figure 3, but the overall result is that a function F , provided
by the function provider, is eventually provisioned to a worker
enclave.
As the function runs, the resource measurement mecha-
nisms in the worker enclave monitor the function’s resource
usage. Once the function completes, these mechanisms finalize
the measurements and output a data structure containing the
metrics shown in Table II. Section VI explains how we measure
each of these quantities.
TABLE II. RESOURCE MEASUREMENT METRICS
tmax Total compute time of the function, reported as a multiple of τ
τ Duration of each tick in CPU cycles
mint Time-integral of memory usage
mmax Maximum memory used by the function
mavg Average memory used by the function
net Total number of network bytes sent and received
In addition, the function itself outputs a fixed-size tag to be
included in the resource measurement data structure. This can
be used by the function provider to check that each resource
measurement corresponds to a valid invocation of the function,
thus preventing a malicious service provider from spuriously
running the function to drive up resource usage. For example,
this tag could be the cryptographic hash of the client’s API
key or authentication token, which the client provided as part
of the encrypted input.
Finally, the worker enclave signs a hash of the complete
resource measurement data structure using kres. This signed
measurement is eventually returned to the function provider,
either immediately or at the end of a billing period.
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uint32_t ecall_setup(key_dist_enclave_addr,
sealed_data*)
uint32_t ecall_init(function*, function_size)
uint32_t ecall_run(encrypted_input*, output_size*)
uint32_t ecall_finish(encrypted_output*, measurements*,
measurement_signature*)
Listing 1. Worker Enclave ECALLs
D. Function Invocation & Output
Once a client has obtained the published set of public
keys from the KDE (Section V-A), and verified the KDE’s
attestation (Section V-B), she runs the key agreement protocol
to generate a symmetric session key K under which to
encrypt her inputs using an authenticated encryption algorithm
(e.g. AES-GCM). Note that this key exchange only achieves
unilateral authentication of the enclave towards the client, since
the enclave’s public key is authenticated via the transitive at-
testation. We assume that any client authentication, if required,
is included in the inputs supplied by the client (e.g. an API
key or authentication token).
In addition to encrypting the inputs for the worker enclave,
the client also wants to ensure that only the intended function
may process her inputs. If this check were omitted, a trivial
attack would be to redirect the client’s input to a function that
simply publishes any input it receives. Unlike typical systems
using remote attestation, this check is necessary in our case
because the function is dynamically provisioned to the worker
enclave after the worker enclave has been attested by the KDE.
To achieve this, the client includes a hash of the intended
function h(F) as part of her encrypted input. Upon receiving
this, the worker enclave checks that this matches the hash of
the function it has loaded, and if not, aborts the invocation
before passing the decrypted inputs to the function.
The client includes a flag r to indicate whether the worker
enclave should produce a receipt of the invocation, and a nonce
n to associate a specific request message with a response. If
the client requests a receipt, the enclave produces a receipt
data structure rec(I,F ,O), signed using kout, certifying that
the output O is the result of executing function F on input I.
To facilitate billing policies in which the client pays for the
computation, the client can also request to receive the resource
measurement data structure described above, and have a hash
of this included in the receipt.
Once the function completes, the worker enclave returns
the outputs and the nonce to the client via the encrypted
channel, and includes the signed resource measurement and
receipt, if requested. If the function terminates abnormally, the
worker enclave sends an error message to the client in lieu of
the output.
E. Worker Enclave Operations
The worker enclave performs four main operations, each
of which is initiated by an ECALL, as shown in Listing 1.
setup: This ECALL triggers the worker enclave to either
obtain its key set from the KDE, or unseal a previously-
received key set. If a new key set is obtained, the enclave will
seal this against its own MRENCLAVE value, and return the
sealed data to the host application. Note that this sealed data
can only be unsealed by the same enclave running on the same
physical server. When the service provider rotates the key set,
this ECALL is used to trigger the worker enclave to obtain the
new key set from the KDE. This ECALL is performed as a
preparatory step before any function is provisioned, and thus
does not contribute any performance overhead to a function
invocation.
init: When a function is provisioned, this ECALL takes
the specified function as a parameter and loads this into the
sandbox. The service provider can configure whether the time
required to load the function is included in the total compute
time measurement.
run: When a function invocation is requested, this
ECALL is called with the encrypted inputs as parameters. The
enclave first calculates the shared session key K using its own
key agreement key kka, and the client’s public key kc+. It
then decrypts the inputs and checks if the function hash h(F)
supplied by the client matches the hash of the loaded function.
If the hashes match, the function is invoked on the decrypted
inputs. If the function produces an output, this ECALL returns
the size of the output, allowing the host application to allocate
the correct size buffers outside the enclave.
finish: Finally, this ECALL copies the encrypted output
and signed resource measurements out of the enclave. These
will be sent to the client and function provider respectively.
VI. SGX RESOURCE MEASUREMENT
A. Compute Time
By far the most challenging quantity to measure is the time
spent executing the function’s code within the enclave. There
are various pitfalls of performing this type of measurement in
the presence of a potentially adversarial OS, as we assume in
our threat model (Section III-A). Specifically, we cannot rely
on OCALLs and must account for the possibility that the OS
could cause an asynchronous enclave exit (AEX) at any time.
We take a similar approach to the reference clock proposed
by Chen et al. [14], but adapt this to measure resource usage.
Specifically, since all designs will inherently have some inac-
curacy, we maintain the invariant that our timing mechanism
will always provide a strict lower bound of the time taken to
execute the function, thus making it suitable for use in a billing
policy.
The central idea is to use Intel’s hyperthreading technology
to enable two concurrently executing threads per worker en-
clave: a worker thread that executes the function, and a timer
thread that measures the time the worker thread spends inside
the enclave. Our timer thread measures time as an integer
number of time periods, each of duration τ CPU cycles. This
is analogous to a clock where τ is the duration between each
clock tick. The τ CPU cycles are in turn measured using a
calibrated for loop. As we discuss in Section VI-A5, the value
of τ can be configured by the service provider, but will always
be reported in the signed resource measurements.
The main challenge is that the timer thread must be able
to check whether the worker thread is currently in the enclave,
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Fig. 4. Overview of interactions between timer and worker threads.
especially given that the OS can interrupt the worker thread
at any time. This would be trivial to check if the timer thread
could read the Thread Control Structure (TCS) of the worker
thread, but in the current version of SGX, any explicit memory
access to a TCS results in a Page-Fault exception [26]. To
achieve this functionality with current hardware, we use Intel’s
Transaction Synchronization Extensions (TSX). An overview
of our approach is shown in Figure 4 and described in detail
below.
1) Start and end of function: When starting a new invo-
cation of a function, the host application spawns two threads.
With the first thread, it calls the ecall_timer ECALL, thus
making this the timing thread. Once inside the enclave, the
timing thread waits on a condition. The host application then
uses the second thread to call the ecall_run ECALL, as
described in Section V-E, making this the worker thread. It
is always in the service provider’s interest to ensure that the
timer thread has been started before starting the worker thread.
Once inside the enclave, the worker thread places a special
marker value in its current save state area (SSA). This is
similar to the approach used by both Cloak [23] and Varys [35]
to ensure two threads remain in the same enclave. The worker
thread then resets the t variable to zero, sets the enclave-wide
proc flag to indicate that processing has started, and signals
to the timer thread via the condition.
The timer thread acquires an enclave-wide mutex to ensure
that only one timer thread can be active at any given time, thus
preventing a malicious service provider from double-counting
the time by running multiple timer threads. The timer thread
checks that the proc flag is set, and if so enters a TSX
transaction (which we refer to as the timer transaction). Within
the transaction, the timer thread checks that the worker thread’s
SSA contains the marker value, which causes TSX to put the
worker thread’s SSA into the read set of the transaction. The
timer thread then executes a for loop to count for a number of
CPU cycles, as defined based on τ . Once the loop completes,
the timer thread increments its internal counter and exits the
TSX transaction. Immediately after the transaction, the timer
thread copies its internal counter to t. Finally, the timer thread
checks if the proc flag is still set, and if so begins a new timer
transaction and repeats the above process. On completion of
the function, the worker thread clears the proc flag, reads the
final time value t = tmax, and includes this in the authenticated
resource measurement report.
In the above design, t is essentially a mirror of the internal
counter. The reason for using these two variables is to avoid
making t part of the transaction’s write set, as would be the
case if t were incremented within the transaction. If t were part
of the write set, operations that read t during a transaction from
another thread (e.g. our memory measurement mechanism)
may under certain conditions cause the timer transaction to
abort.
One potential problem faced by Chen et al. [14] in the
design of their reference clock is that if the adversary can
interrupt the clock thread between the end of the transaction
and the increment of the clock variable (e.g. using the SGX-
Step framework [40]), he can cause the clock to lose time.
However, this is not a problem in our scenario, because it is not
in the service provider’s interest to under-report the function’s
compute time. In other words, interrupting our timer thread at
this (or any other point) is always detrimental to the adversary.
2) Worker thread interrupt: In some cases, the OS may
legitimately need to interrupt and resume the worker thread.
We therefore require a way for the timer thread to detect when
the worker thread has been interrupted and pause the timer.
When the worker thread is interrupted (i.e. an AEX event), the
CPU will save the registers to the worker thread’s SSA. This
will cause the TSX transaction of the timer thread to abort,
since the worker thread’s SSA is in the timer transaction’s read
set. If the transaction is aborted, neither the internal counter
nor t will be incremented for this partially completed tick.
When the timer thread attempts to restart the transaction, it
will detect that the worker thread has been interrupted because
the marker in the worker thread’s SSA was overwritten by the
CPU during the AEX.
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.text
.globl custom_eresume_handler
.type custom_eresume_handler,@function
custom_eresume_handler:
push push lea g_worker_ssa_gpr( mov (
movl $12345,( pop pop jmp *g_original_ssa_rip(
Listing 2. Custom ERESUME handler
Having detected the interrupt, we also need a way for
the timer thread to detect when the worker thread has been
resumed. Typically, the ERESUME instruction transparently
restores the CPU registers from the SSA and continues exe-
cution from the next instruction, which would not allow us to
signal to the timer thread or recreate the marker in the SSA.
We overcome this challenge by creating a custom ERESUME
handler inside the enclave. Specifically, when the timer thread
detects that the worker thread has been interrupted, it modifies
the worker thread’s SSA and swaps the instruction pointer
(RIP) with the address of our custom handler. The original
instruction pointer value is saved separately so that it can
be accessed by our handler. Thus when the worker thread
is resumed via ERESUME, it executes our custom handler
instead of resuming the function.
Listing 2 shows the main functionality of our custom
ERESUME handler. We need the custom handler to recreate
the marker in the worker thread’s SSA and then continue exe-
cuting the function from the point at which it was interrupted.
However, since the ERESUME instruction has already restored
all the registers from the SSA, our custom handler cannot
clobber any registers. We therefore implement the handler
directly in assembly to control its precise behavior. As shown
in Listing 2, we first store the rax and rbx registers on the
stack. We then dereference a pointer to the worker thread’s
SSA in order to write our marker value ($12345). Finally,
we pop rbx and rax and jump to the original RIP.
3) Timer thread interrupt: As explained above, interrupting
the timer thread is always detrimental to the service provider
because it reduces the measured compute time for the function.
However, it may still be necessary for an honest service
provider to interrupt the timer thread. If the timer thread was
inside a transaction when it was interrupted, the transaction
will be aborted. When the timer thread is resumed, it will
simply continue with the timing loop as described above (i.e.
checking the proc flag and the marker value in the worker
thread’s SSA). No custom resume handler is required for the
timer thread.
In rare cases, the OS may also need to interrupt the worker
thread while the timer thread is interrupted. If the timer thread
is resumed first, it will detect that the worker thread has been
interrupted, based on the absence of the marker in the worker
thread’s SSA, and will set up the custom ERESUME handler,
as described in Section VI-A2. If the worker thread is resumed
first, it cannot notify the (interrupted) timer thread, and so
any compute time will not be measured until the timer thread
is resumed and the worker thread is interrupted and resumed
again. Neither of these scenarios allow the service provider to
inflate the compute time measurement. As before, it is always
in the service provider’s interest to ensure that the timer thread
is running before starting or resuming the worker thread.
4) Worker thread OCALL: If the worker thread is required
to perform an OCALL, we need to pause the timer thread
and resume it when the OCALL returns. We instrument the
OCALL code to clear the enclave-wide proc flag. This does
not interrupt the timer thread (i.e. it will complete the current
tick), but prevents it from counting further. Although it would
be possible to interrupt the timer thread, this could be abused
by a malicious function provider triggering frequent OCALLs
in an attempt to reduce the measured compute time. When the
OCALL returns, it sets the proc flag and signals to the timer
thread to resume.
5) Choosing τ : We allow the service provider to choose τ
independently for each worker enclave. This parameter cannot
be changed once the enclave has been initialized, and it is
included in the authenticated resource measurement report
provided at the end of the function. Making this parameter
configurable allows the service provider to determine the
optimum value for their environment, based on their expected
interrupt frequency. A shorter value of τ would reduce the
amount of time under-reported if the worker or timer thread
is interrupted during the for loop. However, the timer thread
must perform various checks between transactions, which are
not included in the measured time. A shorter value of τ would
result in more frequent transactions and thus more cycles spent
on these checks, also leading to under-reporting.
B. Memory Usage
The most fine-grained measurement of a function’s mem-
ory usage is the time-integral mint of the function’s memory
allocation over the duration of the function:
mint =
∫ tmax
0
m(t) dt (1)
where tmax is the total compute time of the function, and
m(t) is the instantaneous memory allocated by the function at
time t. We also measure the maximum instantaneous memory
usage at any point during the function’s execution (mmax), and
the average memory usage over the duration of the function
(mavg):
mmax = max
0≤t≤tmax
m(t) (2)
mavg =
mint
tmax
(3)
The service provider can use either or both measurements
in their billing policy. To measure memory usage, we in-
strument the malloc, realloc, and free functions used
by the sandbox. This ensures that any code running within
the sandbox can only use these instrumented functions. As
memory is allocated, reallocated, or freed, we update mint
and mmax. We use the internal variable m(t) to represent the
current amount of memory allocated by the function at time
t, and the variable tmem to represent the time at which m(t)
was last changed.
On any malloc, realloc, or free event, we perform
Algorithm 1, with the net amount of memory allocated or freed
as the input δm. Specifically, we first obtain the current value
of t and subtract tmem from this to obtain the number of time
periods since the previous change δt. We then multiply m(t)
9
by δt and add the result to mint. We then increase or decrease
m(t) by the amount of memory allocated or freed, and set
tmem to the current value of t. Finally, we check if the new
m(t) value exceeds the previous maximum value mmax and,
if so, we update mmax.
Algorithm 1 Memory measurement update
Input: δm
1: δt← t− tmem
2: mint ← mint + (δt×m(t))
3: m(t)← m(t) + δm
4: tmem ← t
5: if (m(t) > mmax) then
6: mmax ← m(t)
7: end if
Since the function may terminate without explicitly freeing
all its allocated memory, we perform a final integration step
at the end of the function: we calculate the δt since the last
tmem, multiply this by the final value of m(t), and add the
result to mint.
Since our timing mechanism counts time in integer multiple
of τ (i.e. ticks), we cannot measure time intervals smaller than
τ CPU cycles. In Algorithm 1, this means that any memory
changes δm occurring between ticks are all treated as having
occurred at the last tick. Depending on the behavior of the
function, this could result in slightly over- or under-reporting
mint. For example, memory that is allocated just before a
tick will be treated as having been allocated nearly one tick
earlier. Conversely, memory that is allocated and freed between
two ticks will not be included in mint. This is an inherent
limitation of using a time source with values of τ > 1.
However, note that the value of mmax will always be precisely
calculated, so if a function allocates and then frees a very large
memory area between ticks, this will be visible in mmax. We
quantitatively evaluate this in Section VIII-B, and show that
memory measurement accuracy can be maximized by setting
a small value of τ .
C. Network Usage
Networking calls from inside the enclave are passed to
the untrusted environment via an OCALL. After the OCALL
resumes, the total number of bytes sent and received is added to
the network usage metric before the output of the networking
call is returned to the function.
VII. IMPLEMENTATION IN OPENWHISK
We integrated our S-FaaS architecture and resource mea-
surement mechanisms in the Apache OpenWhisk FaaS frame-
work [5] in order to 1) demonstrate that our architecture
is compatible with an existing framework, and 2) evaluate
the overall performance impact of our changes. OpenWhisk
supports functions written in various languages, including
JavaScript/NodeJS, Swift, Python, and Java. It also supports
custom logic in Docker containers.
To integrate S-FaaS with OpenWhisk, we created a new
Docker image containing our worker enclave. Inside our
worker enclave we implemented the resource measurement
mechanisms described in the previous section. Similarly to
Milutinovic et al. [34], we use the Duktape JavaScript inter-
preter [17] because of its portable design and low memory
footprint. However, we could have used any suitable interpreter
or sandbox, including the MuJS JavaScript interpreter used by
Goltzsche et al. [20] in the TrustJS system, or Ryoan [24], a
request-oriented sandbox for SGX.
When a client submits a request, OpenWhisk initially
stores this in a database of pending requests until it can
be dispatched to a suitable worker. In S-FaaS, this input is
already encrypted, as explained in Section V, but this does not
require modification of OpenWhisk. To handle this request,
OpenWhisk creates a new Docker container, which initializes
the worker enclave. As explained in Section V, if a sealed key
set is not already available, the worker enclave contacts the
provisioning enclave and requests the necessary keys. Once
a key set has been provisioned to a particular platform, we
store the sealed key set locally and make this available to all
Docker containers on the platform. The worker enclave then
processes the request as usual, and produces the output (if any)
encrypted for the client. OpenWhisk again stores this output
in a database until it is sent to the client. The signed resource
measurements produced by our worker enclaves can also be
stored in the OpenWhisk database and sent to the function
provider for billing purposes.
VIII. EVALUATION
A. Security Analysis
Security: To meet Requirement R1, a malicious service
provider must be prevented from modifying the inputs or
outputs of a function invocation, and the client must receive
assurance that received output O is the result of a correct
execution of the intended function F on the supplied inputs
I. As explained in Section V-B, our transitive attestation
protocol provides the equivalent level of assurance as if the
client had directly attested the specific worker enclave. After
attesting the key distribution enclave (KDE), the client can
therefore trust that only a worker enclave with the correct
MRENCLAVE value will have access to the key set published
by the KDE. The use of authenticated encryption protects
both the confidentiality and integrity of the client’s inputs in
transit. Even if the service provider provisions an incorrect
function, the worker enclave will detect the mismatch based
on the hash of the intended function included in the client’s
input. If the service provider replays a previous output to
the client, the client will detect this because the nonce in
the output will not match the nonce the client included in
the encrypted input. Even if the client accidentally re-uses
nonces, any manipulation of I, F , or O would be visible in
the signed receipt. Similar arguments apply for the function
provider establishing the trustworthiness of a worker enclave
and checking the veracity of a resource measurement report
produced by the enclave (Requirement R4).
Input & output privacy: Given the known side-channel
attacks against SGX, we cannot guarantee the confidentiality
of inputs and outputs for arbitrary functions. Functions that
exhibit secret-dependent control flow are likely to be vulner-
able to attacks that infer this control flow from outside the
enclave (e.g. [30]) whilst those exhibiting secret-dependent
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memory access could be vulnerable to cache and page-based
side-channel attacks (e.g. [42], [11], [7]). Although it would
be possible to include various defenses against these some of
these side-channel attacks (e.g. [12], [14], [23], [36]), this is
an orthogonal problem to ours. Notably, three state of the
art defenses against cache side-channel attacks, Cloak [23],
HyperRace [12], and Varys [35], all require that the attacker is
prevented from controlling the sibling hyperthread. Our timer
thread inherently fulfils this requirement. Furthermore, since
our worker enclave itself does not exhibit secret-dependent
control flow or memory access patterns, we do not intro-
duce any vectors for side-channel attacks that were not al-
ready present in the provisioned function. Therefore we can
only achieve requirement R2 for functions exhibiting secret-
independent control flow and memory access patterns.
Resource measurement integrity: As explained in Sec-
tion V, the sandbox in the worker enclave protects the integrity
of our resource measurement mechanisms against the function.
Therefore, even a malicious function provider cannot interfere
with the timing thread, evade the instrumented memory man-
agement functions, or modify the internal state of any of these
mechanisms. Conversely, the enclave protects the resource
measurement mechanisms against a malicious service provider.
Although the service provider can always interrupt either the
timer or worker thread, this is never in the service provider’s
interest, as explained in Section VI. Therefore, S-FaaS fulfils
Requirement R4.
TCB size: We measured the size of the Trusted Computing
Base (TCB) of the worker enclave and key distribution enclave
(KDE) using David A. Wheeler’s sloccount tool.2 The
Duktape JavaScript interpreter itself is approximately 65,000
lines of C code. However, we assume this code is trustwor-
thy, and could instead use other types of sandboxes (e.g.
Ryoan [24]) in order to minimize the TCB. Excluding the SGX
trusted libraries and the JavaScript interpreter, our resource
measurement mechanisms add approximately 731 lines of C++
code to the worker enclave. Our KDE consists of only 195
lines of C++ code. Thus the critical S-FaaS code is amenable
to security audits or possibly even formal verification.
Damage containment: By default, all worker enclaves
share the same MRENCLAVE value, so if one instance of a
worker enclave were compromised, it would be able to unseal
keys used for different functions in other worker enclaves.
To mitigate this risk, S-FaaS can be configured to provide
damage containment by parametrizing the worker enclaves,
either by function or by client. Since this parametrization
changes the worker enclave’s MRENCLAVE value, the enclave
is restricted to certain functions of clients. Data sealed by a
parametrized enclave is thus protected against enclaves with
different parametrization or non-parametrized enclaves. The
service provider can thus use this mechanism to balance be-
tween flexibility (i.e., the ability to run any task on any worker
enclave) and damage containment. The parametrization can
also be applied selectively, e.g., creating a set of parametrized
worker enclaves for each large customer, and a set of general-
purpose worker enclaves for other customers.
2https://www.dwheeler.com/sloccount/
function input(params) {
var n = params.iterations || 1;
var values = new Array(n);
values[0] = 0;
values[1] = 1;
for(var i=2; i<=n; i++){
values[i] = values[i-1] + values[i-2];
}
var udata = params.udata || "udata"
var result = JSON.stringify({result: values[n]});
return JSON.stringify({output:result,
measurements_udata: udata});
}
Listing 3. Fibonacci test function
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Fig. 5. Compute time (tmax) measurements of the fibonacci function
for different values of τ (average of 10 runs).
B. Measurement Accuracy
We evaluate the accuracy of our compute time, mem-
ory, and network usage measurements by running synthetic
benchmark functions with known characteristics. To evaluate
compute time and memory, we use a synthetic Fibonacci
function that takes a single integer n as an input parameter.
This function calculates the first n+1 numbers in the Fibonacci
sequence and stores them in a pre-allocated list, as shown
in Listing 3. Both the time and memory complexity of this
function are therefore O(n) in the input parameter.
Figure 5 shows the measured time (y-axis) for different
values of the input parameter (x-axis), with different values of
τ . Although we did not explicitly interrupt the worker thread,
but the normal OS scheduling still caused some interrupts
during these tests. For comparison, we also measured the
total runtime of the ecall_run ECALL from outside the
enclave, indicated as outside enclave in Figure 5. Although the
time measured outside the enclave also includes the ECALL,
the time taken for this is negligible in comparison to the
runtime of the function. Given that the time complexity of
our Fibonacci function is O(n) in the input parameter, it
would be expected that the time increases linearly with the
input parameter. As shown in Figure 5, for all values of τ our
measured values exhibit linear behavior in the input parameter.
As expected, setting a very low value of τ = 630 cycles results
in under-reporting, as explained in Section VI-A5.
Figure 6 shows the average values of mint for different
values of the input parameter. As before, we did not explicitly
interrupt the worker thread, Given that both the time and
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Fig. 6. Memory time-integral (mint) measurements of measurements of the
fibonacci function for different values of τ (average of 10 runs).
memory complexity of our Fibonacci function are O(n)
in the input parameter, it would be expected that the time-
integral of memory mint increases quadratically with the input
parameter. As shown in Figure 6, our measured values all ex-
hibit quadratic behavior in the input parameter (cf. the dashed
quadratic line in the figure). As with the timing measurement,
very low values of τ result in under-reporting. Although it is
not straight-forward to perform the same type of measurement
from outside the enclave, we confirmed the validity of our mint
measurements by dividing the measured mint values by tmax
to obtain the time-averaged memory usage for each function,
and checked that this increases linearly in the input parameter,
as expected.
Finally, to test network usage, we created a synthetic
known_network function that sends and receives a specified
number of bytes via the network interface. In all cases, the
enclave’s resource measurement mechanism correctly mea-
sured the number of bytes sent and received. Our resource
measurement mechanisms therefore fulfil Requirement R3.
C. Performance
We quantified two different aspects of the additional la-
tency incurred when using S-FaaS: 1) the impact of our S-
FaaS resource measurement mechanisms, and 2) the overall
impact of S-FaaS when integrated with OpenWhisk. The
former depends on the specific function, whilst the latter is
a fixed latency overhead that applies to any function. All
benchmarks were built with the Intel SGX SDK version 2.2
and run on Ubuntu 18.04 on an Intel Core i5 CPU with 8 GB
of RAM.
Resource Measurement Latency: To quantify the latency
increase of our resource measurement mechanisms on the
function, we used several benchmark functions from the Oc-
tane [22] JavaScript benchmark suite. This is the same bench-
mark suite used by the developers of the Duktape interpreter to
compare performance between versions and other interpreters.
Although the Octane benchmarks include their own timing
functionality, we do not use this because we want to measure
the overall execution time. We excluded some benchmarks that
are not realistic use cases of FaaS (e.g. displaying graphics).
The functionality of each benchmark is described in the Octane
benchmark reference [22].
TABLE III. RESOURCE MEASUREMENT OVERHEAD
Function Baseline S-FaaS
Time (seconds) No encryption Encryption Enc. & receipt
Box2D 3.019 3.118 3.121 3.135
DeltaBlue 1.446 1.524 1.529 1.537
NavierStokes 4.155 4.418 4.447 4.473
RayTrace 0.779 0.848 0.850 0.852
Richards 1.719 1.767 1.767 1.799
Mean 1.893 1.993 1.998 2.013
Overhead - 5.3% 5.6% 6.3%
We ran each benchmark for three different scenarios. In the
first scenario, the inputs and outputs are not encrypted. This
would be used during incremental deployment of S-FaaS (see
Section IX-C), or for clients who do not require encryption. In
the second scenario, the inputs and outputs are encrypted, and
in the third scenario, the client additionally requests a signed
receipt of the function’s execution, as explained in Section V.
In all cases, S-FaaS provides a signed resource measurement
report. As a baseline, we compare these measurements against
the same Duktape interpreter, running inside an SGX enclave,
with no input/output encryption or resource measurement (i.e.
the same environment as used by Milutinovic et al. [34]). All
measurements are the average of 10 runs.
As shown in Table III, the average overhead of our S-
FaaS resource measurement over the benchmark suite ranges
from 5.3% without encryption to 6.3% with full encryption
and a signed transaction receipt. The resource measurement
overhead includes any additional time required to initialize and
synchronize the worker and timer threads and to generate the
signed resource measurement report.
Pre-function latency: To quantify the additional end-to-
end latency of starting a function when S-FaaS is integrated
with OpenWhisk, we measured the response time of an empty
JavaScript function with and without S-FaaS in both cold-
start and warm-start scenarios. In the cold-start case, there are
no S-FaaS Docker containers or Worker Enclaves running,
as would be the case for the first invocation of a function.
This measurement therefore includes the time to start the
Docker container, initialize the Worker Enclave, unseal the
key set, load the Duktape interpreter, provision the function
to the interpreter, marshal the inputs into the Worker Enclave,
perform the key agreement with the client, decrypt the inputs,
and return the result to the client.
For frequently used functions, it is likely that the system
would already have a Docker container and Worker Enclave
loaded for the specific function, resulting in a significantly
faster warm-start. In this case, the measurement includes
only the time to marshal the inputs into the Worker Enclave,
perform the key agreement with the client, decrypt the inputs,
and return the result to the client. Since we are using an
empty function, these measurements are independent of the
specific function invoked, and thus constitute a fixed latency
overhead of using S-FaaS with OpenWhisk. As a baseline,
we compare these measurements against the same Duktape
JavaScript interpreter, running inside a native OpenWhisk
container. All measurements are the average of 10 runs. As
shown in Table IV, S-FaaS adds less than 3% additional
latency before the function.
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TABLE IV. PRE-FUNCTION LATENCY FOR OPENWHISK + S-FAAS
Baseline (std dev) S-FaaS (std dev) Overhead
Cold start 3,179 ms (40 ms) 3,246 ms (38 ms) 2.1%
Warm start 204 ms (106 ms) 210 ms (149 ms) 2.9%
All benchmarks in this section assume an unloaded server,
as may be the case for a small ephemeral service provider. As
future work, we plan to evaluate the performance of S-FaaS
on a fully-loaded cluster, as might be found in a large cloud
provider’s data center. We could use a similar approach to
Vaucher et al. [41], who performed this type of evaluation for
SGX-enabled containers in the Kubernetes orchestrator using
the Google Borg traces.
IX. DISCUSSION
A. Trade-offs and Limitations
Additional thread: One potential limitation of our mech-
anism for measuring compute time is that, for each worker
thread, we have to dedicate the sibling hyperthread to solely
perform the timing measurement. However, there are two
reasons why our approach will not significantly diminish per-
formance in real-world deployments. Firstly, since the sibling
hyperthreads share the first level (L1) cache, it is known that
some cloud providers disable hyperthreading to prevent sibling
hyperthreads from causing costly cache evictions. Secondly,
controlling both sibling hyperthreads is already necessary for
preventing various cache-line side-channel attacks, as is the
case in Cloak [23], HyperRace [12], and Varys [35]. Our timer
thread can thus serve as a benign sibling hyperthread.
Timing granularity: As explained in Section VI-A5 and
Section VI-B, the granularity of our timing mechanism is
an inherent trade-off. Reducing the duration of the period τ
would improve the accuracy of the compute time measurement
tmax, and the time-integral of memory usage mint. However,
shorter periods require more frequent TSX transactions, thus
increasing the percentage of time the timer thread spends
creating these transactions (i.e. thus under-reporting t and
mint). We therefore allow each service provider to determine
the optimum value of τ for their specific circumstances and
billing policy, whilst still ensuring the trustworthiness of the
resource measurement by including τ in the signed resource
measurement.
Architecture-specific calibration: In our timing thread,
we have calibrated the iteration count of the for loop to
take the specified number of CPU cycles (τ ) on current
SGX-capable CPUs. Although this suffices for all current
SGX parts, we may need to revisit this calibration for future
SGX-enabled CPUs. This would also require a trustworthy
mechanism through which the service provider could report
what type of CPU and timing calibration they are using.
B. Suggested SGX Enhancements
Given the challenges we faced in designing and implement-
ing S-FaaS, we propose a wish list of improvements to the
current SGX design. We only include suggestions that do not
overtly require significant changes to the current SGX design.
Secure tick count: As explained in Section 38.6.1 of the
Intel Software Developer’s Manual [26], reading the CPU tick
counter using the RDTSC instruction is only supported in
SGX2. However, even if accessible, this cannot be used for
resource measurements because its value can be manipulated
by privileged system software outside the enclave (e.g. the
hypervisor can virtualize this tick counter and provide different
values to different VMs). If SGX enclaves had access to a
secure tick counter that could not be manipulated by untrusted
software, S-FaaS could use this instead of our calibrated loop.
ERESUME handler: Even with a secure tick counter,
the timing mechanism would still need a way to detect asyn-
chronous enclave exists and transparent ERESUME events. If
the enclave could specify a custom ERESUME handler, similar
to our design in section VI-A2, this could be used to account
for these events. To accurately measure time spent inside the
enclave, this handler would still need to know when the enclave
was interrupted. This could be achieved by having the CPU
store the current value of the secure tick counter in the thread’s
SSA when the enclave is interrupted. Upon ERESUME, the
custom handler could simply calculate the time for which
the enclave was interrupted. This custom ERESUME handler
could also be used to enhance the security of enclaves in other
ways. For example, it could be used to directly detect unusually
frequent enclave interrupts, similarly to the De´ja` vu system by
Chen et al. [14].
Concurrently with our work, Oleksenko et al. [35] pro-
posed similar SGX hardware enhancements to improve the
efficiency of Varys, their system for defending against side-
channel attacks on SGX enclaves. This indicates that the
above enhancements could benefit multiple different types of
systems.
C. Deployability Considerations
Deployment without client changes: To improve deploy-
ability, S-FaaS can be deployed in an incremental manner
such that it does not require changing the service provider
and clients simultaneously. By making message encryption
optional in the worker enclaves, S-FaaS can be deployed
completely transparently to clients. However, the function
provider can still receive an authenticated report of the func-
tions resource consumption. Without client encryption, the
function provider may require an alternative solution to check
that the function is only called by authorized clients (e.g. a
single-use authorization token bound to the client’s inputs).
Once S-FaaS is in place, clients can incrementally transition
to using encryption as needed.
Implementations with other TEEs: Although our current
implementation of S-FaaS uses Intel SGX and TSX, the design
can in principle also be implemented using other TEE tech-
nologies that provide isolated execution and remote attestation.
For example, in ARM TrustZone, the secure world is more
privileged than the normal world, and thus the former cannot
be interrupted by the latter. Running S-FaaS in the secure
world would still require a suitable sandbox to constrain the
function, but could potentially use a simpler timing approach
if the secure world has access to a secure tick counter.
Although TrustZone itself does not provide remote attestation,
this functionality is typically provided by the vendor of the
secure world’s trusted OS. Brenner et al. [8] have proposed
TrApps, an architecture for securing general-purpose cloud
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workloads using ARM TrustZone, which could make use of
our resource measurement mechanisms.
Integration with Smart Contracts: Various approaches
have been proposed to improve security, privacy, performance,
and efficiency of smart contracts by performing certain com-
putations inside TEEs [6], [33], [15], [28]. However, none
of these describe how the service providers operating the
TEEs are compensated for the use of their (often scarce)
computational resources. More broadly, the idea of using smart
contracts to pay for outsourced computation has only recently
begun to be explored. For example, the Golem network [19]
uses Ethereum-based transactions to settle payments between
users and providers of outsourced computation. However, it is
unclear how accountability is achieved in this setting.
Since our S-FaaS resource measurements can be automat-
ically verified, these can be used directly in smart contracts
to enable decentralized payment for outsourced computation.
For example, the billing policy could be instantiated as a smart
contract that transfers funds to the service provider at a pre-
agreed rate after presentation of a correctly signed and attested
function receipt. Using this type of smart contract without
verifiable resource consumption measurements could lead to
over-charging by service providers, or disputes that must be
manually resolved.
Automated decentralized payment is particularly important
for allowing small ephemeral service providers (e.g. individ-
uals) to enter the market. Since these small entities cannot
in general rely on the reputation-based trust enjoyed by estab-
lished cloud providers, S-FaaS enables them to prove that they
will perform the computation securely and measure resource
usage correctly.
Other use cases: In addition to automated decentralized
billing, verifiable resource usage measurements can also be
used for other purposes. For example, Zhang et al. [43] and the
Anker network [1] have both proposed using TEEs to perform
useful computations as a mechanism for leader elections (e.g.
to decide which node will mine the next block in a blockchain).
The more computations a miner performs, the greater their
chance of mining the next block. S-FaaS could also be used
for this purpose.
X. RELATED WORK
Resource measurement: Tople et al. [39] proposed Veri-
count, a system for measuring resource usage of SGX en-
claves. Similarly to S-FaaS, Vericount places the resource
measurement mechanism within the same enclave as the code
to be measured, and measures compute time, memory, network
bandwidth, and I/O resources used by the enclave. It protects
the resource measurement code from other code within the
enclave using software fault isolation (SFI) techniques. How-
ever, Vericount cannot be directly used in the FaaS context for
two reasons: firstly, given our adversary model, Vericount’s
mechanism for measuring compute time could be arbitrarily
inflated by an adversarial service provider, and secondly its
mechanism for measuring memory usage is too coarse-grained
for the FaaS context.
To measure compute time, Vericount instruments every
ECALL to read and store the starting time using the SGX
trusted time function (sgx_get_trusted_time) provided
by the SGX SDK. Before the ECALL returns, the same
function is again called to obtain the end time. Additionally, the
start and end times of each OCALL are also recorded using the
same timing API. The total time spent inside the enclave can
thus be calculated from the start and end times of the ECALL,
minus the time spent on OCALLs. In our adversary model, the
service provider could interrupt the enclave without causing
an OCALL. This type of interrupt triggers an Asynchronous
Enclave Exit (AEX), from which the enclave can later be
resumed using the ERESUME instruction. However, since
AEX events are not accounted for in Vericount, the time for
which the enclave is interrupted will be included in the total
CPU time. Furthermore, the SGX trusted time function itself
causes an OCALL, since the time value is provided by an
architectural enclave. Once control has been transferred to the
malicious OS through this OCALL, the OS can delay the
request arbitrarily. For example, the OS can delay the final
call to the SGX trusted time function to arbitrarily inflate the
end time value.
To measure memory usage, Vericount only records the
maximum allowed memory of the enclave, but does not
measure the enclave’s actual memory allocation, either as a
maximum, average, or time-varying quantity. This is likely
too coarse-grained for the FaaS context, because the mem-
ory requirements of a single function may vary significantly
depending on e.g. the size of the input. Since the enclave’s
maximum permissible memory is statically defined in the
compiled enclave, a function provider would have to either
pay for the largest possible memory allocation for every
function invocation, or provide multiple enclaves with different
maximum memory sizes, which would result in different
MRENCLAVE values in the remote attestation.
Measuring time: One solution to the timing problem is
the reference clock designed by Chen et al. [14] as part of
the De´ja` vu system. They were the first to suggest using TSX
to measure time within an enclave, and they use this to mea-
sure the time between selected basic blocks of the enclave’s
code. An unusually long execution time between basic blocks
indicates that one or more AEXs have occurred, and this can
be used to detect side-channel attacks. In comparison to our
resource measurement mechanism, the main difference is that
De´ja` vu aims to implement an accurate clock whereas we
aim to implement an accurate lower bound timer that can
be used as the basis for billing policies. This gives rise to
two fundamental design differences: Firstly, for the reference
clock, it is important to detect interruption of the reference
clock thread, which they achieve by randomizing the number
of CPU cycles each transaction takes. In contrast, we use a
calibrated fixed τ , so that this can be reported to the function
provider. As we explain in Section VI, it is not in the service
provider’s interest to interrupt our timing thread. Secondly,
whereas De´ja` vu instruments selected basic blocks to read
the reference clock when they are executed, we use TSX to
detect when the worker thread is interrupted and pause our
time measurement.
Liang et al. [31] proposed TrustedClock for SGX, which
uses System Management Mode (SMM) to generate and sign
a high-precision timestamp, so that it can be verified by the
enclave. However, since this involves an OCALL to pass the
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request from the enclave to SMM, this timing mechanism is
not suitable for resource measurement because the untrusted
OS could delay this OCALL, and thus arbitrarily inflate the
measured time.
Counting instructions: Instead of measuring time in CPU
cycles, Zhang et al. [43] propose to count the number of
instructions executed within the enclave. A core aspect of
their Resource Efficient Mining (REM) framework is Proof
of Useful Work (PoUW), in which a TEE is used to perform
arbitrary useful computations. The more computations a miner
performs, the greater their chance of mining the next block.
To count the number of executed instructions, they use a
customized toolchain that i) reserves a register for instruction
counting and ii) instruments the start of each basic block
with an instruction to increase the count by the number of
instructions in the block. Although counting instructions is
sufficient for their purposes, they acknowledge that counting
CPU cycles would be a more accurate metric of CPU effort.
In the Varys system, Oleksenko et al. [35] use a rough count
of instructions to estimate the frequency of AEX events, since
some side-channel attacks require an unusually high frequency
of AEX events. Again, counting instructions is sufficiently
accurate for this purpose. Similarly to our approach, when they
require fine-grained timing, they spawn an enclave thread and
increment a global variable in a tight loop.
Other uses of TSX: Shih et al. [38] also use TSX to defend
against page-fault side-channel attacks. Specifically, their T-
SGX system encapsulates sensitive enclave code in a TSX
transaction and leverages the property that errors (e.g. page
faults) occurring within a transaction are not reported to the
underlying OS, thus making known controlled-channel attacks
impractical.
Gruss et al. [23] use TSX to defend against cache side-
channel attacks. Their key insight is that a TSX transaction
requires all memory it accesses to remain in the CPU caches
for the duration of the transaction. A premature eviction of
some memory results in a transaction abort. Code that exhibits
secret-dependent control flow or data memory accesses is
typically vulnerable to cache-base side channel attacks. By en-
capsulating such code in TSX transactions, their Cloak system
ensures that if a transaction completes, all sensitive code and
data must have remained in the CPU caches, otherwise the
transaction would abort and roll back any memory changes.
One challenge faced by Cloak is that code and data in a
transaction’s read set are not protected against a malicious sib-
ling hyperthread, which can mount cache side-channel attacks
from outside the enclave using the L1 and L2 caches it shares
with the thread in the enclave. To enforce that two threads
remain in the enclave, they have each thread write a unique
marker to each other’s SSA, making it part of the read set of
the transactions. An interrupt of either thread overwrites the
marker in the SSA, and can be detected from the other thread.
We use this technique to detect interruptions of the worker
thread from our timer thread.
Securing outsourced computation: Rutkowska [27] re-
cently described work towards running arbitrary payloads in
SGX enclaves in the context of the Golem network that out-
sources computation to individuals. This is complementary to
S-FaaS, and could make use of our mechanisms for accurately
and reliably measuring and reporting resource consumption
from these small ephemeral service providers.
Similarly, Brenner et al. [9] presented Vert.x Vault, a
design for running Java-based Vert-x micro services in SGX
enclaves, and more broadly, the SecureCloud project [29] aims
to secure cloud-based micro services using hardware security
mechanisms. On the client-side, TrustJS [20] allows server-
supplied JavaScript to be run in an enclave. If required, the
S-FaaS resource measurement mechanisms could provide fine-
grained resource measurement for any of these services.
These mechanisms can also be used in other SGX-based
services, even if they do not support arbitrary computation.
For example, they could form the basis of an auditable billing
policy for SecureKeeper [10], an enhanced version of Apache
ZooKeeper that protects data using SGX.
XI. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
The emerging Function-as-a-Service (FaaS) paradigm pro-
vides numerous benefits, especially in terms of allowing small
ephemeral entities (e.g. individuals) to offer comparable ser-
vices to large cloud providers. However, FaaS significantly
exacerbates the challenges of i) ensuring the integrity of
outsourced computation, ii) minimizing the information leaked
to the service provider, and iii) accurately measuring and
reliably reporting computational resource usage.
We introduce S-FaaS, the first architecture and implemen-
tation of FaaS to provide strong security and accountability
guarantees backed by Intel SGX. We have demonstrated that
our design can support existing FaaS workflows by implement-
ing and integrating it with the OpenWhisk FaaS framework.
Our S-FaaS resource measurement functionality adds less
than 6.3% overhead when applied to the Duktape JavaScript
interpreter inside an SGX enclave. Our resource measurement
mechanisms, based on Intel TSX, can accurately and reliably
measure the compute time, memory, and network usage of a
function, and can also be used in other applications beyond
FaaS. As future work, we plan to extend S-FaaS to support
functions written in other languages, and to support other types
of hardware-based TEEs.
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